



# Events, permissions, and obligations

## *... and their refinement*

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(with thanks to Frédéric Cuppens and Dominique Méry)

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# Context



- Project on information security
  - access control
  - information flow
  
- Static system model : who may / must (not) do what ?
  - identify organizations, roles, activities, contexts, etc
  - assign permissions / user rights and responsibilities
  
- Integration with dynamic system model
  - (temporal) properties of behaviors
  - stepwise refinement preserving “deontic” properties



# Framework: event systems

**system** *Bank*

**constants** *Client, Loan, maxDebt*

**variables** *loans, clt, due, rate*

**invariant**  $\wedge \text{loans} \subseteq \text{Loan}$

$\wedge \text{clt} \in [\text{loans} \rightarrow \text{Client}] \wedge \text{due} \in [\text{loans} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}] \wedge \text{rate} \in [\text{loans} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}]$

$\wedge \forall c \in \text{Client} : \sum\{\text{due}(ll) : ll \in \text{loans} \wedge \text{clt}(ll) = c\} \leq \text{maxDebt}$

**initial**  $\text{loans} = \emptyset$

**event**  $\text{newLoan}(c : \text{Client}, l : \text{Loan}, \text{sum} : \mathbb{N}, \text{dur} : \mathbb{N}) \equiv$

$\wedge l \notin \text{loans} \wedge \text{sum} + \sum\{\text{due}(ll) : ll \in \text{loans} \wedge \text{clt}(ll) = c\} \leq \text{maxDebt}$

$\wedge \text{loans}' = \text{loans} \cup \{l\} \wedge \text{clt}' = \text{clt} \cup \{l \mapsto c\}$

$\wedge \text{due}' = \text{due} \cup \{l \mapsto \text{sum}\} \wedge \text{rate}' = \text{rate} \cup \{l \mapsto \text{sum}/\text{dur}\}$

**event**  $\text{payRate}(l : \text{Loan}) \equiv$

$\wedge l \in \text{loans}$

$\wedge \text{due}' = \text{due} \oplus \{l \mapsto \text{due}(l) - \text{rate}(l)\}$

$\wedge \text{clt}' = \text{clt} \wedge \text{rate}' = \text{rate}$

# Properties (safety)



- Stable predicates

$$\frac{P \wedge e(x) \Rightarrow P' \quad \text{for all events } e}{\text{stable } P}$$

- Invariants

$$\frac{\text{Init} \Rightarrow P \quad \text{stable } P}{\text{inv } P}$$

$$\frac{\text{inv } P \quad P \Rightarrow Q}{\text{always } Q}$$

- **Proof obligation** : **inv** *Inv*

for the declared system invariant *Inv*



# Adding fairness conditions



- Event systems describe what *can* occur
- Fairness ensures that events *do* occur eventually

$$\begin{aligned} \text{event } \text{payRate}(l : \text{Loan}) &\equiv \\ &\wedge l \in \text{loans} \\ &\wedge \text{due}' = \text{due} \oplus \{l \mapsto \text{due}(l) - \text{rate}(l)\} \\ &\wedge \text{clt}' = \text{clt} \wedge \text{rate}' = \text{rate} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{fairness } l \in \text{loans} \wedge \text{due}(l) > 0$$

- This talk : weak fairness
  - if condition persists, event must eventually occur
  - condition may be stronger than guard



# Properties (liveness)



•  $F \rightsquigarrow G$  : every  $F$  will be followed by  $G$

• verification rules

$$\frac{P \wedge a(x) \wedge \neg e(t) \Rightarrow P' \vee Q' \quad \text{for all events } a \quad P \Rightarrow \text{fair}_e(t)}{P \rightsquigarrow Q \vee (P \wedge e(t))}$$

$$\frac{P \wedge e(t) \Rightarrow Q'}{P \wedge e(t) \rightsquigarrow Q}$$

$$\frac{F \Rightarrow G}{F \rightsquigarrow G}$$

$$\frac{\text{inv } I \quad I \wedge F \rightsquigarrow G \vee \neg I}{F \rightsquigarrow G}$$

$$\frac{\forall x \in S : F(x) \rightsquigarrow G \vee (\exists y \in S : y \prec x \wedge F(y)) \quad (S, \prec) \text{ well-founded}}{(\exists x \in S : F(x)) \rightsquigarrow G \quad (x \text{ not free in } G)}$$

$$\frac{F \rightsquigarrow G \quad G \rightsquigarrow H}{F \rightsquigarrow H}$$

$$\frac{F \rightsquigarrow H \quad G \rightsquigarrow H}{F \vee G \rightsquigarrow H}$$


$$\frac{F \rightsquigarrow G}{(\exists x : F) \rightsquigarrow (\exists x : G)}$$



# Refinement : intuition




- add detail to model, but preserve properties
  - different data representation, related by linking invariant  $J$
  - refine grain of atomicity of events
- map concrete events to abstract ones (maybe stutter)



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




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common extra conditions :

- eventually perform abstract events
- relative deadlock freedom

here : preserve fairness



# Refinement : proof obligations



- simulation of initial condition

$$Init_{ref} \Rightarrow \exists var_{abs} : Init_{abs} \wedge J$$

- step simulation (possibly stuttering)

$$er(t) \wedge J \Rightarrow \exists u, var'_{abs} : ea(u) \wedge J' \quad (er \text{ refines } ea)$$

$$er(t) \wedge J \Rightarrow \exists var'_{abs} : var'_{abs} = var_{abs} \wedge J' \quad (er \text{ new event})$$

- refinement of fairness constraints  $(er_1, \dots, er_n \text{ refine } ea)$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{true} \rightsquigarrow & \bigvee \neg(\exists var_{abs} : fair_{ea}(u) \wedge J) \\ & \bigvee (\exists t_1 : er_1(t_1)) \bigvee \dots \bigvee (\exists t_n : er_n(t_n)) \end{aligned}$$



# Refinement : properties



- simulation of traces

for every trace of the concrete system *Ref*

there is a corresponding trace of the abstract system *Abs*



# Refinement : properties



- simulation of traces

for every trace of the concrete system  $Ref$

there is a corresponding trace of the abstract system  $Abs$

- preservation of properties modulo linking invariant

$$Abs \models \mathbf{stable} P \quad \Rightarrow \quad Ref \models \mathbf{stable} (\exists var_{abs} : P \wedge J)$$

$$Abs \models \mathbf{inv} P \quad \Rightarrow \quad Ref \models \mathbf{inv} \bar{P}$$

$$Abs \models \mathbf{always} P \quad \Rightarrow \quad Ref \models \mathbf{always} \bar{P}$$

$$Abs \models F \rightsquigarrow G \quad \Rightarrow \quad Ref \models \bar{F} \rightsquigarrow \bar{G}$$



# Permissions & obligations



- Who may/must do what, under what circumstances ?
  - static model of entities and activities (Or-BAC)  
represented as constants and events
  - specify permissions / rights and obligations  
add corresponding predicates to event definitions



# Permissions & obligations



- Who may/must do what, under what circumstances ?
  - static model of entities and activities (Or-BAC)  
represented as constants and events
  - specify permissions / rights and obligations  
add corresponding predicates to event definitions
- Relation with system model ?
  - verify “deontic” properties of model
  - and adapt refinement relation



# Representing permissions



- Extend description of events

**event**  $newLoan(c : Client, l : Loan, sum : \mathbb{N}, dur : \mathbb{N}) \equiv \dots$

**permission**  $l \notin loans \wedge risk(c, sum) \in \{low, medium\}$

**interdiction**  $risk(c, sum) = high$

- Verification conditions ensure that annotations hold

- invariant and permission implies guard

- invariant and interdiction implies negation of guard

**always**  $\neg(e(t) \wedge intd_e(t))$



# Representing obligations



- Similarly add obligation predicates

**event**  $payRate(l : Loan) \equiv \dots$

**obligation**  $l \in loans \wedge due(l) > 0$

- Temporal interpretation

strict obligation  $obl_e(t) \rightsquigarrow e(t)$

weak obligation  $obl_e(t) \rightsquigarrow \neg obl_e(t) \vee e(t)$  [this is just weak fairness!]

- We know how to establish these properties





# Refinement : preserving properties



- Obligations & interdictions : nothing to prove
  - expressed as (linear-time) properties of traces
  - hence preserved by refinement



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
- Obligations & interdictions : nothing to prove
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  - hence preserved by refinement
- Permissions : more problematic
  - refinement does not preserve branching behavior
  - what should be preserved across non-atomic refinement ??
  - refined event won't be executable whenever abstract one is



# Refinement of permissions




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  - *and* a concrete-level obligation (to simulate the event)



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
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# Refinement of permissions



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- Formalization (assume  $ea$  refined by  $er_1, \dots, er_n$ )  
identify “initial events”  $ei_1, \dots, ei_m$  of refined model where

$$\overline{perm_{ea}} \Rightarrow perm_{ei_1} \vee \dots \vee perm_{ei_m} \quad \text{and}$$

$$ei_j \rightsquigarrow \neg \overline{perm_{ea}} \vee er_1 \vee \dots \vee er_n$$



# Example



- Refining event *newLoan*

**event**  $askLoan(c : Client, l : Loan, sum : \mathbb{N}, dur : \mathbb{N}) \equiv \dots$

**permission**  $l \notin loans$

**event**  $approveLoan(l : Loan, e : Employee) \equiv \dots$

**permission**

$\wedge l \in non\_approved$

$\wedge \vee risk(clt(l), due(l)) = low \wedge rank(e) \geq Clerk$

$\vee risk(clt(l), due(l)) = medium \wedge rank(e) \geq Manager$

**interdiction**  $risk(clt(l), due(l)) = high$

**obligation**  $l \in non\_approved \wedge risk(clt(l), due(l)) \in \{low, medium\}$



# Observations



- Refinement of permissions is transitive
  - introduce explicit permission on “initial” event
  - has to be taken into account when refining further
- Weak interpretation of obligations adequate
  - consider client applying for two loans concurrently
  - no obligation to approve them both



# Summing up



- slight extension of event systems
- represent permissions, interdictions, obligations
- property-preserving refinement rules
  - non-atomic refinement of events
  - inheritance of linear-time properties
  - basic branching-time properties : enabledness + liveness
- future work : controllers for security policies

