Efficiently deciding equivalence for standard primitives and phases
 Véronique Cortier,  Stéphanie Delaune, and  Antoine Dallon.  Efficiently deciding equivalence for standard                  primitives and phases. In  Proceedings of the 23rd European Symposium on                  Research in Computer Security, Part I                  (ESORICS'18), pp. 491–511,  Lecture Notes in Computer Science  11098,  Springer, September 2018.
  doi:10.1007/978-3-319-99073-6_24
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Abstract
 Privacy properties like anonymity or untraceability                  are now well identified, desirable goals of many                  security protocols. Such properties are typically                  stated as equivalence properties.  However,                  automatically checking equivalence of protocols                  often yields efficiency issues.  
 We propose an                  efficient algorithm, based on graph planning and                  SAT-solving. It can decide equivalence for a bounded                  number of sessions, for protocols with standard                  cryptographic primitives and phases (often necessary                  to specify privacy properties), provided protocols                  are well-typed, that is encrypted messages cannot be                  confused.  The resulting implementation, SAT-Equiv,                  demonstrates a significant speed-up w.r.t. other                  existing tools that decide equivalence, covering                  typically more than 100 sessions.  Combined with a                  previous result, SAT-Equiv can now be used to prove                  security, for some protocols, for an unbounded                  number of sessions.
BibTeX
@InProceedings{SAT-Equiv-Esorics18,
  author =	 {V\'eronique Cortier and St\'ephanie Delaune and
                  Antoine Dallon},
  title =	 {Efficiently deciding equivalence for standard
                  primitives and phases},
  booktitle =	 {{P}roceedings of the 23rd {E}uropean {S}ymposium on
                  {R}esearch in {C}omputer {S}ecurity, Part I
                  (ESORICS'18)},
  year =	 2018,
  abstract =	 {Privacy properties like anonymity or untraceability
                  are now well identified, desirable goals of many
                  security protocols. Such properties are typically
                  stated as equivalence properties.  However,
                  automatically checking equivalence of protocols
                  often yields efficiency issues.  \par We propose an
                  efficient algorithm, based on graph planning and
                  SAT-solving. It can decide equivalence for a bounded
                  number of sessions, for protocols with standard
                  cryptographic primitives and phases (often necessary
                  to specify privacy properties), provided protocols
                  are well-typed, that is encrypted messages cannot be
                  confused.  The resulting implementation, SAT-Equiv,
                  demonstrates a significant speed-up w.r.t. other
                  existing tools that decide equivalence, covering
                  typically more than 100 sessions.  Combined with a
                  previous result, SAT-Equiv can now be used to prove
                  security, for some protocols, for an unbounded
                  number of sessions.},
  pages =	 {491--511},
  month =	 sep,
  publisher =	 {Springer},
  series =	 {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  volume =	 11098,
  acronym =	 {{ESORICS}'18},
  nmonth =	 9,
  doi =		 {10.1007/978-3-319-99073-6_24},
                  ={https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01819366/document},
}